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HAMILTON'S FEDERALIST- TREATISE FOR
FREE GOVERNMENT*
Gottfried Dietzet
The 200th anniversary of Alexander Hamilton's birth1 is an occasion
to reconsider the work of a statesman whose impact upon American
constitutional development was probably greater than that of anyone
else. The New Yorker, who played a minor role at the Federal Convention and had only a small share in the framing of the Constitution, became the originator of and chief contributor to that law's classical commentary, the FEDERALIST. Strangely enough, no systematic analysis of
his essays has ever been undertaken. To fill this gap, is the purpose of
the following appraisal of what probably constitutes Hamilton's most
comprehensive contribution to American political thought and practice.
Hamilton was a firm believer in a government where the majority is,
for the sake of minority rights, bound by a constitution; where popular
participation in government is only a means for the protection of the
individual, i.e., where, in order to prevent sheer majority rule or democratic despotism, the democratic participation-principle is inferior to the
liberal protection-principle.2 This was to him "Free Government."
It is this concept of Free Government which forms the core of Hamil* This article will form part of a comprehensive study of the Federalist papers which
Professor Dietze intends to publish as a book next year. Occasional references to Madison
in this article refer to opinions as expressed by the Virginian in -the Federalist.
t See Contributors' Section, Masthead, p. 374, for biographical data.
1 Hamilton was born January 11, 1757, on the island of Nevis, one of the British West

Indies.
2 In the polemics of the period in which the Federalist was written, the protectionprinciple applied mainly to the protection of private property-private property once

being referred to by Hamilton as "the great and fundamental distinction of society"
(Quoted by Alpheus T. Mason, Free Government in the Making 193 (1950) ). Hamilton
had been a staunch defender of property from the beginning (see his letters to Robert
Morris of Sept. 28, 1782, to Washington of Feb. 7, 1783, and March 17, 1783, to Governor
Clinton of June 1, 1783. 9 Works 292, 310, 323, 343 (Fed. ed.) (hereinafter cited as
"Works")). Seeing the threat to property rights coming mainly from the sheer majority
rule as it existed under most of the state constitutions under the Articles of Confederation,
a rule which at that time was known by the term "democracy," Hamilton "detested the
latter, because he believed it must end in despotism, and, be in the same time, destructive
to public morality." H Diary and Letters of Gouverneur Morris 523 (A.C. Morris, ed.
1889). For other examples of Hamilton's fear of democracy, see his letters to Governor
Clinton of May 14, 1783, to Washington of Sept. 30, 1783, 9 Works 342, 386, Compare
also his "Resolutions for a General Convention of June 30, 1783," 1 Works 305.
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ton's FEDERALIST. Thus his essays are, in an absolute sense, advocacy of
Free Government and not, as is generally believed, a treatise in favor
of a more perfect Union. For the Union was conceived by Hamilton to be
nothing but a means for the establishment of Free Government. Paradoxically, Hamilton himself laid the groundwork for this misconception.
He starts out in Essay 1 saying that the deliberation on the Constitution
is a subject that "speaks its own importance; comprehending in its consequences nothing less than the existence of the UNION, the safety and
welfare of the parts of which it is composed," and ends by saying, "I
propose . . .to discuss the following particulars :-The utility of the
UNION

to your political prosperity.... The conformity of the proposed

Constitution to the true principles of republican government . . . and

lastly, the additional security which its adoption will afford to the preservation of that species of government, to liberty and property." Advocacy
of the Union as the main aim of his essays seems to be indicated here.
However, a more careful reading reveals that such an advocacy is the
purpose of Hamilton's writing in only a relative sense: "Union" and the
"safety and welfare of the parts of which it is composed" are actually inseparable. This means that through Union there will be safety and welfare. And if there is a "utility of the Union ...to political prosperity,"
the Union must be a means which will bring about "security ... to...

liberty and property." Consequently not Union, but Free Government is
the main objective of Hamilton's FEDERALIST.
The idea of Free Government is present throughout Hamilton's discussions, be they of a theoretical or practical nature. Thus Hamilton, while
giving an exposition of his ideal form of government and showing theoretical possibilities for its realization, also demonstrates how, in practice,
Free Government is jeopardized under the Articles of Confederation and
how it could be secured under the Constitution. In the following pages,
an attempt shall be made to prove that Hamilton's contribution to the
Federalist constitutes a complete system not only, as is generally believed, on the practice, but also on the theory of government.' Therefore,
we shall, by duly putting the concept of Free Government in the center,
emphasize the distinction between theory and practice. A theoretical discussion, dealing with Hamilton's concept of the nature of Free Government and the possibilities for its realization, shall be followed by an
analysis of Hamilton's opinions on the practice of American government,
3 Hamilton speaks, in the Federalist, of "theory and practice." The Federalist No. 31,
at 190 (E.M. Earle ed. 1937) (hereinafter cited by number and page only, as 31, 190).
He stresses "theory against fact and reality" (34, 203) and says that "to give a minority
a negative upon the majority . . . is one of those refinements which, in practice, has an
effect the reverse of what is expected from it in theory" (22, 135). He himself thus refutes
the idea that his Federalist is only a treatise on the practice of government.
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showing how Free Government is negated under the Articles of Confederation and achieved under the Constitution. Since, to the New
Yorker, the concept of Free Government evolves around the rights of
man, we shall start out with a note on Hamilton's opinion of man, as put
down in the FEDERALIST.
THE NATURE OF MAN

Like Madison, Hamilton draws in his FEDERALIST a picture of man
which is consistent with the belief in Free Government and politically expedient for an advocate of the Constitution and an opponent of the
status quo. He depicts man as able and worthy of self-government but
does not hesitate to show that "frailty of human nature"4 which brought
about the crisis under the Confederation.
Complaining of the "folly and wickedness of mankind,"' 5 that "momentary passions, and immediate interests have a more active and imperious control over human conduct than general or remote considerations of policy, utility, or justice," 6 Hamilton considers human nature,
as does Madison, under the criteria of rationality (man's folly, passion,
reasonable consideration) and ethics (man's wickedness). Hamilton's
statement that government has been instituted "because the passions
of men will not conform to the dictates of reason ...

without restraint 7

shows a policy of non-commitment as to the character of human nature.
While complaining about man's passions, he does not deny that man has
reason, a dualism one comes across again and again in his FEDERALIST.' As to Hamilton's evaluation of man from an ethical point of view,
he pessimistically states that "men are ambitious, vindictive, and rapacious,"' 9 "governed... by ...private inclinations and interests,"'" liable

to "cabal, intrigue, and corruption.""
"their pride ...

their

virtue."'-2

Nevertheless, he counts upon

Saying that the "supposition of universal

venality in human nature is little less an error ...than the supposition
4 24, 100.
5 78, 510.
6 6, 30.
7 15, 92.

s Hamilton speaks of "the passions . . .of the reasoner" (31, 189); of "men of upright
... tempers" who have "opportunities of remarking . . . how . . . the great interests of
society are sacrificed to the vanity . . . of individuals, who have credit enough to make
their passions . . . interesting to mankind" (70, 458). People "sometimes err," but "the
wonder is that they so seldom err as they do" (71, 465). While speaking of the "passions
of mankind" (27, 168; 76, 493), "the passions of the community" (65, 424), "heats and
ferments" of the people (68, 442), Hamilton admits that there are men "of calm and
dispassionate feelings" (24, 100).
9 6, 27.
10

76, 495.

11 68, 442.
12 66, 435.
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of universal rectitudel"
Hamilton views "human nature as it is, without flattering its virtue or exaggerating its vices."' 4
Through this policy of non-commitment, Hamilton puts himself in a
position from which he may either condemn or praise man, just as it suits
his purpose. With an eye to the threat to property in the states, he can
blame man's wickedness: "If Shays had not been a desperate debtor"
who, motivated by unethical egoism, did not want to fulfill his obligations, "it is much to be doubted whether Massachusetts would have been
plunged into a civil war."'1 5 "Popular assemblies" like those in the States
with their rag-money legislation, are "frequently subject to the impulse
of rage, resentment, jealousy, avarice, and the other irregular and violent
propensities."" On the other hand, when advocating the Constitution,
Hamilton is not sparing with his praise of man. Since the Constitution
creates a representative government, he hastens to remark that "the
institution of delegated power implies, that there is a portion of virtue
and honor among mankind, which may be a reasonable foundation of
confidence; and experience justifies the theory."'
He expresses his
trust in the members of Congress"8 and the judiciary. 9
Hamilton's view on human nature has, as does Madison's, implications
that amount to a justification of Free Government. By seeing man as
reasonable and good, he justifies popular government, whereas by showing man as passionate, he demonstrates the necessity for the protection
of the individual. We have here an indication of the core of the FEDERALIST. Since the problem of his time was the protection of the propertyowning minority from the legislatures controlled by the debtors, Hamilton, while fundamentally recognizing popular government, wants it restricted under a constitution. From here only one more step is needed to
proclaim the doctrine of judicial review. The function to pass on the
constitutionality of legislative acts is, for Hamilton, in good hands with
the judges, who "unite the requisite integrity with the requisite knowl2o
edge."
13 76, 495.
14 76, 496.
15 6, 29.
18 6, 30.
1T 76, 495.
18 26, 164; 67, 435.
19 79, 511. With regard to the treaty-making power of the President, Hamilton remarks,
in order to justify the Senate's co-function: "An avaricious man might be tempted to betray the interests of the state to the acquisition of wealth. An ambitious man might make
his own aggrandizement, by the aid of a foreign power, the price of his treachery to his
constituents. The history of human conduct does not warrant that exalted opinion of human
virtue which would make it wise in a nation to commit interests of so delicate and momentous a kind, as those which concern its intercourse with the rest of the world, to the
sole disposal of a magistrate created and circumstanced as would be a President of the
United States" (75, 487). See also 72, 471.
20 79, 511.
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THEORY OF FREE GOVERNMENT

The Nature of Free Government
Since in the state of nature" man's actions do "not conform to the
dictates of reason and justice," individuals become induced "to the establishment of civil power" 22 and "enter into a state of society" the laws of
which become "the supreme regulator of their conduct. '2 3 Security for
their "rights and privileges ... is attainable in civil society,' 2 4 but not
in the state of nature 5 Hamilton nowhere specifies in the FEDERALIST
how the state of nature is left behind. However, that this is done
through a social compact follows from his recognition of a parallel between the formation of a state by individuals and of a confederacy by
states,2 6 the latter coming into existence by compact.2 7 The compact by
which the people subject themselves to a "civil power" 2s----Hamilton's
distinction between the social compact proper and the compact between
the society and government is of no relevance here, 29-- is a voluntary act
21 Hamilton mentions that term in "The Farmer Refuted," written in 1775. He says that
the colonists going to a new land "looked upon themselves as having reverted to a state of
nature." I Works 102. Also 3 Works 291.
22 15, 92.

23 33, 201.
24 28, 173.
25 Since "the laws of ... society" are "the supreme regulator" of the individual's conduct
(33, 201), and since there are no such laws in the state of nature, the state of nature must
be lawless, i.e., an anarchy. It is interesting to note in that respect Hamilton's discussion
of Hobbes in "The Farmer Refuted." Hobbes held, Hamilton writes, that man in the state
of nature was "perfectly free from all restraint of law and government. Moral obligation,
according to him, is derived from the introduction of civil society; and there is no virtue
but what is purely artificial, the mere contrivance of politicians for the maintenance of
social intercourse. But the reason he ran into this absurd and impious doctrine was that he
disbelieved in the existence of an intelligent, superintending principle, who is the governor,
and will be the final judge, of the universe. . . . To grant that there is a Supreme Intelligence who ruled the world and has established laws to regulate the actions of his
creatures, and still to assert that man, in a state of nature, may be considered as perfectly
free from all restraints of law and government, appears, to a common understanding, altogether irreconcilable." 1 Works 61-62. The word "law" is here used by Hamilton in the
sense of natural law. More frequently, law is for him "a rule which those to whom it is
prescribed are bound to observe" (33, 201), i.e., it has a sanction. Since such a positive
law does obviously not exist for Hamilton in the state of nature, the state of nature must,
with respect to positive law, be a state of lawlessness, of anarchy. R. C. Mulford, in
The Political Theories of Alexander Hamilton (1903), does not see this distinction between
natural and positive law and thus comes to the conclusion that to Hamilton the state of
nature was not anarchic (p. 20).
26 "If individuals enter into a state of society, the laws of that society must be the
supreme regulator of their conduct. If a number of political societies enter into a larger
political society, the laws which the latter may enact .. . must necessarily be supreme over
those societies" (33, 201).
27 For the fact that the Confederation came into existence by a compact, see 21, 125;
22, 140-41; 24, 149; 30, 183. For the fact that the United States under the Constitution
came into being by compact, see 85, 571.

28 15, 92.

29 When Hamilton speaks of "a voluntary compact between the rulers and the ruled"
("The Farmer Refuted," 1 Works 63), he must presuppose a compact by which "the
ruled," able to conclude a compact with "the rulers," come into existence as a party to that
compact.
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of weak and strong individuals."0 To conclude, it can be said that the
individuals subject themselves to the "constraint" of a government 3 ' in
order to have the rule of force replaced by the rule of "the laws of...
society"3 under which they will "conform to the dictates of reason and
justice.1 33 Like Madison, Hamilton sees the protection principle at the
very foundation of society.
The same goes for the participation principle. After establishing civil
society, the people as the "pure, original fountain of all legitimate authority" 34 do not become politically passive. As its fountain, they constantly nourish government through their participation.
The concomitance of the protection and participation principles at the
beginning of civil society is for Hamilton as natural a coincidence as for
Madison. The individuals, leaving the state of nature in order to be
protected, do not want to replace the bellum omnium contra omnes by a
bellum regis contra subiectos. Consequently, they choose a government
which is most likely to protect their rights, i.e., one in which they participate.
If we consider the relation of the two principles under the criterion of
cause and effect, their co-existence at the beginning of civil society has
important implications with regard to their concomitance within society.
Government is nothing but a means for the individual's protection. Popular participation in government can thus be justified to the degree only as
the rights of the individual are not endangered. This amounts to a
primacy of the people's protection before their participation in government. Before we explain the protection and participation principles, we
shall consider how they are implemented in the relation between the
people and the government. Like Madison, Hamilton sees the relation
from a teleological, a static-factual and a dynamic-legal aspect.
As to the first, "government was instituted" for "the public happiness," 3 a means to an end: "A government ought to contain ... every
power requisite to the ... accomplishment of the objects committed to

its care, and to the complete execution of the trusts for which it is responsible, free from every other control but regard to the public good and to
the sense of the people." 6
30 "The origins of all civil government ...
must be a voluntary compact between the
rulers and the ruled. . . .What original title can any man, or set of men, have to govern
others, except their own consent?" ("The Farmer Refuted," I Works 63). Argumentum
a majori ad minus follows that the social compact is a voluntary one.
31
32
33
34
35
36

15,
33,
15,
22,
71,
31,

92.
201.
92.
141.
464.
190.
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The static-factual relation follows from the fact that the people, when
leaving the state of nature, become society37 under a government. Hamilton's words "if individuals enter into a state of society, the laws of that
society must be the supreme regulator of their conduct" 3 have important
consequences. If individuals enter into a state of society and then are
subject to the laws of that society they become the objects on which
those laws have effects, the society of the state they brought into being.
They are under the "civil power" 39 of that particular state only. In
agreement with Madison, Hamilton considers society as confined within
the bounds of one body politic."
This brings us to the relation between society and government from a
dynamic-legal point of view and the implementations of the protection
and participation principles. Like Madison, Hamilton rejects the government's absolute dependence upon as well as its absolute independence
from society, and expresses himself in favor of a compromise. Government, being instituted "because the passions of men will not conform to
the dictates of reason and justice, without constraint,"141 must possess,
in order that "the laws of ...

society" might be the "supreme regulator"

of the individuals, 42 the power to enforce those laws. A government absolutely dependent on society would not constitute a "civil power1 43
which could "constrain" the people. It could not provide that security
for the individual's "rights and privileges ...

which is attainable in civil

society.1 44 It would be inconsistent with the protection principle. On the
other hand, a government absolutely independent from society is not acceptable either, since it is incompatible with the principle of popular
participation in government.
Hamilton favors a government which is compatible with both the
protection and participation principles, the latter, as a means, being
secondary to the former, as the end. A dependence of the government
upon the people can be suffered to a degree only that the protection of
37 Or "civil society" (28, 172-73), or "the public" (83, 544).

38 33, 201.
39 15, 92.

40 For Hamilton, the quality of society as an intrastate phenomenon follows from such
passages as: "If a number of political societies enter into a larger political society" (33,
201); (quoting Montesquieu) "a confederate republic . . . is a kind of assemblage of societies that constitute a new one" (9, 50-51); "a federal government, which is a composition of societies" (83, 545); (quoting Hume) "a large state or society" (85, 574).
Further, he speaks of "the society" of a particular state (12, 75; 17, 103; 35, 215; 36, 217;

36, 222; 60, 391; 65, 424; 66, 435; 68, 443; 71, 464; 74, 483; 75, 488; 78, 504; 78, 509; 78,
510), of "society" as existent in one particular state (16, 100; 21, 127; 24, 150; 25, 158; 34,
206; 35, 214; 60, 390; 79, 513; 83, 554; 85, 569; 13, 77; 6, 271, 6, 33; 9, 48), of "societies"

of different states (1, 3; 27, 167; 28, 170). He calls the Union a "civil society upon an enlarged scale" (28, 172).
41 15, 92.

42 33, 201.
43 15, 92.
44 28, 173.
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the individual is not hazarded. Although "the deliberate sense of the
community should govern the conduct of those to whom they intrust the
management of their affairs," Hamilton expresses himself against an
"unqualified complaisance" of the government "to every sudden breeze
of passion, or to every transient impulse which the people may receive
from the arts of men, who flatter their prejudices and betray their interests." 45 While fundamentally accepting a dependence of the government on the people, Hamilton wants the government sufficiently independent to fulfil its purpose, namely, the protection of the individual's
rights. Popular participation in government is restricted by a constitution.46
When Hamilton shows government as a means to an end he does not
only infer that popular participation must be secondary to the individual's protection, but also that his FEDERALIST, written for the
adoption of a government, must in an absolute sense be a treatise for the
end this government has to fulfil, namely, the protection of the individual.
The quality of society as an intra-state phenomenon must have a bearing
upon Hamilton's theory on the nature of confederacies. Further, the independence of government under a constitution opens onto the perspective of a government which abuses its power. Against such a government, Hamilton, although aware of the danger that a popular revolution
might go too far, 47 admits a right of revolution: "If the representatives
of the people betray their constituents, there is then no resource left but
in the exertion of that original right of self-defence which is paramount
to all positive forms of government."4 Finally, the subordination of
45 71, 464. "The people commonly intend the PuBrac GooD," Hamilton continues, but they
do not "always reason right about the means of promoting it" because they are "beset .
by the wiles of parasites and sycophants, by the snares of the ambitious, the avaricious, the
desperate, by the artifices of men who possess their confidence more than they deserve it"
(71, 464-65).
41 Although this is nowhere expressly stated in the Federalist, it follows from Hamilton's
rejection of the government's absolute dependence upon and its absolute independence from society: If the people, as represented in the government, were at liberty to
decide the degree of their participation in government (for instance, by ordinary laws),
the government would be absolutely dependent upon the people. On the other hand, had
the government an absolute power to regulate (and forbid) the people's participation, it
would be absolutely independent of society, like a dictatorship. The restriction of participation under a constitution can further be concluded from the fact that in essay 78 Hamilton
accepts judicial review, which means that the branch of government in which the people's
participation is most reflected, is bound by a Constitution: "The Constitution ought to be
the standard of construction for the laws, and ... wherever there is an evident opposition,
the laws ought to give place to the Constitution" (81, 524).
47 26, 159.
48 28, 173. See also 33, 200: "If the federal government should overpass the just bounds
of its authority and make tyrannical use of its powers, the people, whose creature it is, must
appeal to the standard they have formed, and take such measures to redress the injury
done to the Constitution as the exigency may suggest and prudence justify." If unjust election laws were passed, "citizens . . . conscious of their rights, would . . . overthrow their
tyrants, and . . . substitute men who would be disposed to avenge the violated majesty
of the people" (60, 395).
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government under a constitution shows the existence of two sorts of manmade ("positive") , 9 law, namely, "the Constitution and the laws." 50
The former is made by the society, and is fundamental; the latter, made
by the government, is ordinary. Positive law is, since the people have a
right of revolution, under natural law.5'
It remains to explain the protection and participation principles and
their relation to each other in the state. Since Hamilton considers the
individual's protection the end of government, an explanation of the
protection principle can be derived from his specification of that end.
Government being instituted for the distribution of justice,52 Hamilton
explains the end of government more concretely as "the public happiness, 5 3 the "public good."54 He connects the existence of justice with
the well-being of the people, majority and minority alike. 55 More specifically, the people's happiness means the protection of their "general
liberty," their "rights," their "private rights." 56 From his distinction
between liberty and property57 and life and property" follows that he
classifies those rights into the categories commonly used at the time,
namely, the rights of life, liberty and property.
Of these rights, those of property are most important. Their greater
weight, as compared with the rights of liberty,5" follows from Hamilton's
enumeration, in order of importance, of the advantages of an energetic
executive: "The protection of the community against foreign attacks;
... the steady administration of the laws; ... the protection of property
49 "Positive," 28, 173; 78, 807.
50 78, 510.

51 For Hamilton's (nearly Austinian) conception of positive law, see 33, 201: "A LAw
by the very meaning of the term, includes supremacy. It is a rule which those to whom
it is prescribed are bound to observe"; also 15, 91: "It is essential to the ideal of a law,
that it be attended with a sanction; or, in other words, a penalty or punishment for disobedience." In "The Farmer Refuted," Hamilton quotes Blackstone in his definition of
natural law, "which, being coeval with mankind, and dictated by God himself, is . . .
superior in obligations to any other. It is binding over all the globe, in all countries, at all
times. No human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this; and such of them as are
valid, derive their authority ... from this original." 1 Works 62-63.
52 15, 92.
53 71, 464.
54 31, 190.
55 Hamilton considers the permanency of the judicial office as "the citadel of the public
justice and the public security" (78, 505). He speaks of "justice or the public good" (79,
514), of "the ends of public justice and security" (81, 533).
56 78, 504, 508-09. Hamilton often uses the terms "liberties," "rights," and "liberty" when
he speaks of the total of vested rights without specifically stating the meaning of those
terms, as for instance, when he speaks of the "liberties of the great community" (26, 164),
of "our liberties" (26, 165) ; of "rights" (26, 159; 28, 173; 27, 174) ; of the "liberty of the

States . . . against domestic faction and insurrection" (9, 47), of the "vigor of government"
which "is essential to the security of liberty" (comp. also, for "liberty," 9, 48; 70, 462;
71, 467; 78, 504; for "general liberty," 84, 563; 85, 573).
57 1, 6; 25, 156; 70, 454; 83, 845; 85, 567-68.

58 8, 24; 17, 103.
59 "Liberty" is here used in a narrow sense, exclusive of the rights of life and property.

It comprises such rights as the liberty of the press (84, 560; 85, 567), trial by jury (83, 543).
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against irregular and high-handed combinations which sometimes interrupt the ordinary courts of justice; . . . the security of liberty."1°
Hamilton puts the protection of property before the security of liberty
and connects it more closely with that all embracing end of government,
-justice. The prevalence of property before liberty is confirmed when
Hamilton states that among vested rights, those concerning life and
property are most important.6 1 When, finally, he refers hardly ever to
the right of life and very often to property, the conclusion can be drawn
that he attributes a greater weight to the latter, which he referred to as
62
"the great and fundamental distinction in society.)
Although "an actual representation of all classes of the people, by
persons of each class, is altogether visionary,"6 3 the participation principle provides that the government should be in the hands of the representatives of the people. "This is the essential . . . security for the
rights and privileges of the people which is attainable in civil society."6 4
This "popular government"6 5 is a majority government.6 6 In its "excesses"6 7 it may be a tyranny of the popular magistrates, 6 the rule of
an "overbearing majority."6 9 Susceptible to "every sudden breeze of
71
passion, 70° it may proceed to "oppressions of the minor party.
While fundamentally accepting it, Hamilton wants popular government restricted under a constitution so as to secure the protection of the
individual's rights from an "overbearing majority." This ideal 2 form
of government he calls "Free Government. 3
0 70, 454.
61 17, 103.

62 1 Works 410.
63 35, 213.
64 28, 173.
65 For his use of that term, see 12, 72; 18, 110; 83, 543.

66 Hamilton speaks of "the fundamental maxim of republican government, which requires
that the sense of the majority should prevail" (22, 134). Since "republican government" is
a popular government, popular government must be majority government too. Compare
also 22, 135: "To give a minority a negative upon the majority [which always is the case

where more than a majority is requisite to a decision] is . . . to subject the sense of the
greater number to that of the lesser," a "poison."
67
68
69
70
71

70,
83,
60,
71,
78,

458.
543.
390.
464.
508.

72 Hamilton's opinion of Free Government as an ideal can be concluded from the fact
that the only criteria of Free Government are for him its constituting elements, namely,
the individual's protection and popular participation in government, i.e., elements which
may exist in different forms of existing governments. He speaks of "a" free government
(70, 458; 70, 461; 71, 468; 73, 478; 78, 510), or just of "free government" (83, 543), but
never of one concrete free government. Free Government may exist at all times; it was
possible in ancient Greece and Italy (9, 47-48), as it is possible in Hamilton's time under
the new Constitution (70, 458; 70, 461). It is not bound to a particular form of a state,
but possible in the "petty republics of Greece and Italy" (9, 47-48), in England (71, 468),
in the United States (70, 458; 70, 461).
73 The conformity of Free G6vernment to the participation principle is expressed when
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Free Government is mainly threatened by factions. Although Hamilton nowhere defines that term, there can, from the context in which he
uses it, be no doubt that it has for him the same meaning as for Madison.' 4 Hamilton does not demonstrate the origin of faction as elaborately
as Madison. When, however, he says that "seditions and insurrections
are, unhappily, maladies as inseparable from the body politic (i.e., from
any form of government) as tumors and eruptions from the natural
body,'175 we may argumentum a maiori ad minus conclude that even
more so must factions have their roots in a Free Government. Protecting
the individual's rights, this form of government enables people to make
full use of their rights, to become Protestant, Catholic, debtor and
creditor factions. Furthermore, Free Government accepts the rule of the
majority-faction over the minority-faction.
As "unhappy maladies" of Free Government, factions are not part of,
but only a consequence of that government. Being its "tumors and eruptions," they constitute a threat to individual rights and popular government.7 Consequently, Free Government can be secured by controlling
Hamilton speaks of "the superior weight and influence of the legislative body in a free
government" (73, 478), says that "upon the principles of a free government" there must
exist a numerous legislature (70, 458), and that "a voluminous code of laws (made by
that branch of the government that mainly reflects popular government) is one of the inconveniences necessarily connected with the advantages of a free government" (78, 510).
On the other hand, Free Government is consistent with the protection principle when
Hamilton says that the trial by jury is represented "as the very palladium of free government" (83, 543), or that in a free government there must be liberty of the press (84, 560).
In some passages Hamilton even mentions both the protection and participation principle
in connection with Free Government, for instance when he says that "from the disorders
• . . (in ancient) republics the advocates of despotism have drawn arguments, not only
against the forms of repuiblican (i.e. popular) government, but against the very principles
of civil liberty. They have decried all free government as inconsistent with the order of
society" (9, 48). See also 70, 461; 71, 467.
"Good government," while being a free government ("It is one thing to be subordinate
to the laws, and another to be dependent on the legislative body. The first comports with,
the last violates, the fundamental principles of good government" (71, 465-66) ), seems for
Hamilton to be a concrete government with power when he says that "the true test of a
good government is its aptitude and tendency to produce a good administration" (68, 444),
that "energy in the executive is a leading character in the definition of good government"
(70, 454), and, further, considers the independence of the judges as characteristic of
good government (78, 511; 79, 512). See also, for the use of the term "good govern-

ment," 1, 3; 22, 140.
74 "Faction" is for Hamilton, as it is for Madison, identical to "party." He speaks of
the "tempestuous waves of sedition and party rage" (9, 47), says that "the spirit of party,
in different degrees, must be expected to infect all political bodies" (26, 163) or says with
respect to political offenses that "the prosecution of them . . .will . . .agitate the passions
of the .. .community and ... divide it into parties ... [and] in many cases will connect
itself with the pre-existing factions" (65, 424).
75 28, 170-71.
76 The threat of factions to individual rights is expressed when Hamilton thinks an
energetic executive necessary "to the protection of property against those irregular and
high-handed combinations [factions] which sometimes interrupt the ordinary course of
justice; to the security of liberty against the enterprises and assaults of ambition, of faction,
and of anarchy" (70, 454). In 78, 508, Hamilton says that "the independence of the
judges is . . .requisite to guard . . .the rights of individuals from the effects of those ill
humors, which the arts of designing men, or the influence of particular conjunctures, sometimes disseminate among the people . . . and which . . . have a tendency . . .to occasion
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the effects of factions. This means that Free Government exists to the
degree it checks factions. Factions-and here Hamilton goes further
than Madison-are in their consequences not confined within the bounds
of the body politic, but may effect other states and may lead to war."
Concluding, we may say that Hamilton's view of the nature of Free
Government is very similar to that of Madison. The individuals leave
the anarchic state of nature out of self-interest in order to live under a
Free Government which, while being a popular government, restricts
democracy under a constitution for the protection of the individuals' life,
liberty and property. Threatened mainly by its own creature, factions,
Free Government exists to the degree it controls their effects. There
is, however, one dissimilarity to be noted. For Hamilton, the effects of
faction are not felt within one particular body politic only, but may lead
to war with another state.
Since Free Government exists to the degree it controls factions, it follows that Free Government can be best realized in a concrete government
that is likely to control factions. Furthermore, Hamilton, by pointing
out that factions may lead to war, admits that factions in one state may
not be peacefully absorbed by other states and thus prevents himself
from pronouncing a system of territorial balances as a remedy for- factions, a scheme which Madison considers so efficient. What concrete
form of government is considered by Hamilton to be most conducive
to Free Government, we shall now examine.
The Theoretical Realization of Free Government
Hamilton considers a government in which power is conspicuous

7

8

and poised in one center as most conducive to Free Government. Since
power-concentration presupposes power-factors that can be concentrated,
the question is to what degree that concentration of power should exist.
Although Hamilton concedes a division of power in both territorial and
. . .serious oppressions of the minor party," continuing that "occasional ill humors in the
society . . . extend . . .to the injury of the private rights of particular classes of citizens,
by unjust and partial laws" (78, 509). Factions are also endangering popular government:
"The spirit of faction, . . .occasional ill humors, or contemporary prejudices and propensities . . . frequently contaminate the public councils" (27, 167). "It ought not be forgotten that the demon of faction will, at certain seasons, extend his sceptre over all numerous bodies of men" (65, 428). "A spirit of faction . . . is apt to mingle its poison in
the deliberations of all bodies of men" (15, 92). An ambitious individual, by controlling
a strong faction, may become a despot of the people (85, 568).
77 Among the causes of hostility among nations are those "which take their origin entirely
in private passions; in the attachments . . . interests . . . of leading individuals in the
communities of which they are members" (6, 28), i.e., in factions. The connection of interior
factions with war is demonstrated by Hamilton in essay 6. In an argument against the (too
democratic) legislation in the states, he says in 7, 40 that "laws in violation of private
contracts, as they amount to aggressions on the rights of those States whose citizens are
injured by them, may be considered as another probable source of hostility" between states.
78 For the fact that "power" is for Hamilton identical with "government," see 15, 87;
15, 90; 15, 92.
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institutional respects, he permits such a power division only to the degree
that the quality of the government as a power is not put into question
and emphasizes-to a much greater extent than Madison-the necessity
of power-concentration.
79
"The vigor of government" is "essential to the security of liberty."
In order that this vigor, or power, might exist, there must be, since
"every government ought to contain in itself the means of its own
preservation,"8 0 stability in government. To be effective, the government must possess energy."' Both qualities are conducive to Free Government, for only a strong government "can possess . .. energy [and]
stability, . . .can fulfil the purposes of its institution, . . . possess ...

confidence at home" and can "undertake or execute any liberal or en82

larged plans of the public good.1

In view of Hamilton's emphasis on governmental power it is not surprising that he considers territorial and institutional power-division as of
minor importance for a realization of Free Government. Therefore, when
we now inquire into the tendency of concrete governments to promote
Free Government, we shall run across the leitmotif of power-concentration as often as in Madison's FEDERALIST we see the leitmotif of powerbalance.
The popular government-other governments such as monarchy or
aristocracy are priori excluded because of their inconsistency with the
participation principle-most conducive to Free Government is a republic.83 Believing that the tendency to realize Free Government grows
4a

79 1, 5.

80 59, 384.
81 For proof that energy is necessary for a government, see 13, 77: "When the dimensions of a State attain to a certain magnitude, it requires the same energy of government
. . . which [is] requisite in one of much greater extent." "The citizens of America have
too much discernment to be argued into anarchy. And . . . experience has . . . wrought a
deep . . . conviction . . . that greater energy of government is essential to the welfare..
of the community" (26, 160): a government without energy is an anarchy, no government
at all. See also 77, 502: "The executive department . . combines ... all the requisites to
energy."

82 30, 186. The conduciveness of stability to Free Government is evident when Hamilton
identifies stability with the "peace of society" (21, 127) and the "peace of the community"
(72, 471), which, if not identical to, is at least very closely connected with "the public good
or happiness." In 70, 454, Hamilton says: "Energy in the executive is a leading character in
the definition of good government. It is essential . . .to the steady administration of the
laws; to the protection of property against . . . irregular and high-handed combinations
... to the security of liberty against the enterprises ... of faction." He recommends unity
in the executive, because if the executive consisted of a plurality of persons, "they might
split the community into the most violent and irreconcilable factions" (70, 457).
83 Hamilton does not make a clear-cut statement as to the relation between democratic
(popular) and republican government. There can be no doubt, however, that to him republican government is a popular (democratic) government. Speaking of the prohibition of titles
of nobility, he says that "this may truly be denominated the corner-stone of republican
government; for so long as they are excluded there can never be serious danger that the
government will be any other than that of the people" (84, 557). To Hamilton, who speaks
of "the fundamental maxim of republican government which requires that the sense of the
majority should prevail" (22, 134), "the republican principle demands that the deliberate

CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 42

with the extent of the republic, Hamilton considers pure democracy in a
"petty" republic8 4 and representative democracy in a republic, a large
republic and a federal republic.
A pure democracy 5 as it existed in the "petty republics of Greece and
Italy," is plagued by "tempestuous waves of sedition and party rage...
domestic faction and insurrection" and is "in a state of perpetual vibration between the extremes of tyranny and anarchy." 6 It is inconsistent
with both the protection and participation principles and Hamilton concedes even to his opponents that "it is not to be denied that the [unfavorable] portraits they have sketched of republican government were
too just copies of the original from which they were taken.""7
A representative democracy offers a brighter picture. In it "the excellences of republican [popular] government may be retained" and
the requirement of the participation principle be met. Besides, the imperfections inherent in popular government, for instance, the rule of an
overbearing and selfish majority or infringements upon vested rights by
a powerful faction, may be "lessened or avoided."8 8 Thus protection
sense of the community should govern the conduct of those to whom they intrust the
management of their affairs" (71, 464). The fact that republican government is to him
popular government is further evident when he says that in "every government, partaking
of the republican genius," "the most popular branch . .. will be . . . a full match . . . for

every other member of the Government" (66, 431), that "in a republic . . . every magistrate
ought to be personally responsible for his behavior in office" (70, 461), and calls the executive's "dependence on the people" a "safety in the republican sense" (70, 455). There are
even strong hints in Hamilton's Federalist that republican government is identical with
popular government to such a degree as to correspond only to the participation principle,
i.e., possibly endangering vested rights, when in 9, 48 "the forms of republican government"
are distinguished from the "principles of civil liberty," or in 84, 557 "liberty" from "republicanism." In a republic, there may be either direct or indirect democratic government, or
pure or representative democracy: When in essay 9 Hamilton distinguishes a republican
government in which the people are represented in a legislature from the "petty republics
of Greece and Italy," it follows that in the latter there was no representation. (Compare
also his Brief of Argument on the Constitution of the United States of 1788 where he says:
"Democracy in my sense, where the whole power of the government is in the people.
1. Whether exercised by themselves, or 2. By their representatives. . . ." He calls the government under the Constitution a "representative democracy," whereas in other places he calls
the United States a republic. 2 Works 92.
84 9, 47.
85 Speaking about pure democracy (a term he does not mention in the Federalist),
Hamilton said on the floor of the New York Convention on June 21, 1788: "It has been
observed that a pure democracy, if it were practicable, would be the most perfect government. Experience has proved, that no position in politics is more false than this. The
ancient democracies (which he calls "petty republics of Greece and Italy" in the Federalist), in which the people themselves deliberated, never possessed one feature of good
government. Their very character was tyranny; their figure deformity. When they assembled, the field of debate presented an ungovernable mob, not only incapable of deliberation, but prepared for every enormity. In these assemblies the enemies of the people brought
forward their plans of ambition systematically. They were opposed by their enemies of
another party; and . . . the people subjected themselves to be led blindly by one tyrant
or by another." 2 Works 22. The similarity of that passage with the beginning of essay 9
of the Federalist is striking and justifies my speaking of the "pure democracy" in the "petty
republics of Greece and Italy."
86 9, 47.
87 9, 48.
88 9, 49.

1957]

HAMILTON'S FEDERALIST

exists to a higher degree than under the pure democracy of a petty
republic. However, even here an unjust infringement upon the individual's rights is possible: "The representatives of the people, in a popular
assembly, seem sometimes to fancy that they are the people themselves,
and betray strong symptoms of impatience and disgust at the least sign
of opposition.1 89 Therefore, to the factors that "tend to the amelioration
of popular systems of civil government" ' in favor of a greater protection
of the individual, Hamilton adds "the ENLARGEMENT of the ORBIT within
which such systems are to revolve, either in respect to the dimensions of a
single State, or to the consolidation of several smaller States into one
great Confederacy.

' 91

In a large republic the probability of an encroachment on the rights of
the minority by a passionate majority of the legislature is reduced, since
the representative body will be refined. Candidates, in order to get
elected, will have to "possess ...

qualifications to extend their influence

beyond the narrow circles of personal intrigue." 92 Being persons of
good reputation-preferably "proprietors of land, . . . merchants, and
. . . members of the learned professions," 3-- the representatives in a

large republic will be guided in their decisions by reason rather than
passion. Should it happen that they betray their constituents, the people
have a good chance to resist successfully. Since "the obstacles to usurpation and the facilities of resistance increase with the increased extent of
the state, provided the citizens understand their rights and are disposed
to defend them, the natural strength of the people in a large community,
in proportion to the artificial strength of the government, is greater than
in a small, and of course more competent to a struggle with the attempts
of the governments to establish a tyranny.1 94
It is, however, a special form of a large republic which is most conducive to Free Government, namely, "the consolidation of several smaller
States into one great Confederacy."9 5 Complaining of "the spirit of fac89
90
91
92

71, 466.
9, 49.
9, 49.
9, So.
93 36, 216.
94 28, 173-74.

95 9, 49. When Hamilton speaks of the consolidation of states into a confederacy, he shows
that the distinction between Bundesstaat (a consolidation of several states into one state)
and Staatenbund (confederacy in the modem meaning of the term) is not known to him
by terminology. Consequently, there is no clear distinction for him between such terms
as "federal" on the one hand and "confederate, confederation, confederacy" on the other
hand.
To Hamilton in the Federalist, the United States under the Articles is a "confederation" (15, 89; 15, 94; 18, 106; 21, 125; 21, 127; 22, 134; 22, 139; 23, 143; 25, 154; 30, 183;
75, 490; 78, 502; 80, 519; 84, 564) or a "confederacy" (6, 32; 7, 35; 7, 36; 8, 41; 8, 43;
11, 66; 15, 93; 16, 97; 21, 126; 22, 132; 27, 168; 27, 169; 29, 175; 69, 451), which has a
"federal" government (15, 87; 15, 155; 83, 548; 84, 564), a "federal" authority (15, 89;
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tion and . . . those occasional ill-humors, or temporary prejudices . . .
which, in smaller societies, frequently contaminate the public councils,
beget injustice and oppression of a part of the community, and engender
15, 92). He calls the confederacy a "federal plan" (21, 126), the "existing federal system"
(22, 131; 22, 140).
Similarly, the United States under the Constitution is a "confederacy" (9, 52; 27, 168;
27, 169; 29, 175; 69, 448) with a "federal" government (9, 52; 16, 98; 23, 141; 23, 142;
23, 145; 24, 147; 26, 163; 29, 176; 29, 177; 29, 178; 29, 180; 30, 182; 21, 191; 32, 194; 33,
202; 33, 200; 36, 222; 36, 223; 59, 384; 76, 493), under a "federal" authority (27, 166), a
"federal" power (35, 210; 61, 397).
If Hamilton does not distinguish between a Bundesstaat and a Staatenbund by terminology, that distinction does not lie in the fact that the Staatenbund is a league and the
Bundesstaat is not, since to Hamilton both may be leagues: The United States under the
Articles is a league (15, 91; 16, 96), as are the (more consolidated) Lycean and Achaean
leagues (16, 95). Nor does the distinction lie in the quality of either Staatenbund or
Bundesstaat as a union, since the United States is for Hamilton a union under the Articles
(1, 6; 8, 46; 11, 64; 15, 86; 15, 94; 22, 134; 23, 143; 23, 146; 25, 154; 30, 183; 30, 185;
85, 568)) just as it is a union under the Constitution (1, 3; 13, 78; 17, 101; 17, 103; 23,
141; 23, 144; 25, 154; 33, 203; 36, 220; 59, 385; 85, 574).
In spite of all these similarities, Hamilton saw the distinction between a Bundesstaat
and a Staatenbund. It lies for him in the intimacy of the union. Although both Bundesstaat and Staatenbund come for Hamilton into existence by compact (for the fact that the
United States under the Articles came into being by compact, see 21, 125; 22, 141; 24, 149;
30, 183; for the fact that the United States under the Constitution comes into being through
compact, see 85, 571), he emphasizes that the United States under the Constitution (a
Bundesstaat) would come into existence through the "ratification by the PEOPLE" (22,
140) and would "rest on the solid basis of THE CONSENT Or THE PEOPLE" because "the
streams of national power ought to flow immediately from that pure, original fountain
of all legitimate authority" (22, 141). "Immediately," he says, meaning that the assent was
to be given by the American people, irrespective of state boundaries: neither the States nor
their governments played any role in the foundation of the American Bundesstaat. On
the other hand, the Staatenbund under the Articles came into being by a compact between
"the several legislatures" (22, 141), was a "compact between the States" (21, 125).
Resting on the more solid foundation of the assent of the people, the power of the
government of a Bundesstaat is, as compared with that of a Staatenbund, increased insofar as the government can act directly upon individuals. Complaining that "the great and
radical vice in the construction of the existing Confederation is the principle of r.GSLATiON for STATES or GOVERNMMNTS, in their CORPORATE or CoLtECT=VL CAPACITIES, and as
contradistinguished from the nivinuAr.s of which they consist" (15, 89) Hamilton is glad
that the Constitution deviates from that principle which "is in itself evidently incompatible
with the idea of GOVER IENT" (15, 90).
Parallel to the greater power of the government of the Bundesstaat toward individuals
exists its greater power toward the member-states, since resistance to the laws of the federal
government by the commonwealth can be remedied by its acting directly on the citizens.
Being independent of the assistance of the state, the federal government is "empowered
to employ the arm of the ordinary magistrate to execute its own resolutions" (16, 95).
Through its greater power, the federal government prevents the states from falling into a
state of anarchy and civil war (16, 95) and thus the confederacy from dissolution. It is
more likely to slay "the political monster of imperium in imperio" (15, 89) ; see also essays
16 and 22.
Through its greater intimacy and power in the federal government the Bundesstaat is,
in contradistinction to the Staatenbund, a nation, i.e., one state with one government. Although Hamilton conceded that the United States under the Articles had a national government, he leaves no doubt that this government exists only in form, not in fact. Of the
opinion that legislation for states is "incompatible with the idea of GOVERNMNT"
(15, 90), he says that "all the wheels of the national government" are "arrested" (15, 95),
and denies the existence of a national government under the Articles altogether (15, 87;
85, 574), which means that he denies the existence of a nation. On the other hand, Hanlton makes it clear that under the Constitution there will be one national government and
thus one nation, a "majesty of . . . national authority" (16, 98; see also 85, 574), one
"American republic" (70, 461), one federal state.
We shall thus, when in the following we speak of a "federal state," understand under
that term a Bundesstaat, unless stated differently, i.e., "an association of two or more
states into one state" (9, 52).
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schemes which, though they gratify a momentary inclination or desire,
terminate in general distress, dissatisfaction and disgust,"9' 8 Hamilton
praises the "utility of a Confederacy . . .to suppress faction and to
guard the internal tranquility of the States. 9 7 Aside from having a
popular government, a federal republic affords an increased protection of
the individual. Since "the extension of the spheres of election will present
a greater option, or latitude of choice, to the people""8 for the election
of representatives for the lower house and since the representatives for
the upper house will be elected by the state legislatures which "are elect
bodies of men," 99 the probability of a refined representation is greater
even than in a large republic. So is the chance of the people to resist
usurpation: "In a single state, if the persons intrusted with supreme
power become usurpers, the different parcels, subdivisions, or districts
of which it consists, having no distinct government in each, can take
no regular measures for defence,"' 10 0 "but in a confederacy the people,
without exaggeration, may be said to be entirely the masters of their own
fate. Power being almost always the rival of power, the general government will at all times stand ready to check the usurpations of the state
governments, and these will have the same disposition towards the general government. The people, by throwing themselves into either scale,
will infallibly make it preponderate. If their rights are invaded by either,
they can make use of the other as the instruments of redress."'01
While Madison considers a federal state as conducive to Free Government mainly because it creates power-balances, Hamilton does so mainly
for another reason. While admitting the advantages of an internal powerdivision in the words of Montesquieu,'102 he is reluctant to stress the blessings of a power-balance and rather emphasizes those of power-concentration. There is in his FEDERALIST no concert of powers which is so
distinct a feature of Madison's. Not praising the tendency of different
"parts, interests, and classes of citizens" as well as sects 1 3 to balance
each other, as Madison often does, Hamilton emphasizes mainly one
power-rivalry, namely, that of the States against the federal government.
And his statement "power being almost always the rival of power, the
general government will at all times stand ready to check the usurpations
of the state governments, and these will have the same disposition towards
96 27, 167.
97 9, 49.
98 27, 167.
99 Ibid.
10 28, 173.
101 Id. at 174.
102 9, 51.
103 51, 339.
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the general government"'"" means, transferred into the polemics of the
time, simply this: democracy being excessive in the States, the general
government will (and must) stand ready to check the too democratic
state governments. It will have the power to do so. In a word, there will
be enough power concentrated in it to enable it, for the sake of the individual, to deal the death blow to that "political monster"-imperium in
imperio."'5
Though the people's representation is refined in a federal state, Hamilton wants, as a further check upon the legislature, an institutional division of power: "It is a fundamental maxim of free government, that the
three great departments of power, legislative, executive, and judiciary,
06
shall be essentially distinct and independent, the one of the other."2
Calling "the regular distribution of power into distinct departments; the
introduction of legislative balances and checks" great improvements in
the science of politics, 0 7 Hamilton sees in the separation of powers mainly
a device for checking the legislature as the department most susceptible
to democratic excesses. Since there is a "superior weight and influence
of the legislative body in a free government," 0 the legislature, "the
favorite of the people,"' 9 the "AARON's ROD most likely to swallow
up" the other departments," 0 has to be checked for the protection of
the individual. This is possible if the partition of powers is so contrived
"as to render the one independent of the other."'
"To what purpose
separate the executive or the judiciary from the legislative, if both the
executive and the judiciary are so constituted as to be at the absolute
'1428, 174.
105 15, 89. This

interpretation of the passage in essay 28 is not only compatible with, but
even follows from Hamilton's constantly emphasizing the relative badness of representative
government in smaller societies, as was just shown. Further, his desire for a concentration
of power in the federal government is reflected in his regretting the want of power in the
general government under the Articles (15, 94; 15, 87; 85, 574).
106 "Examination of Jefferson's message to Congress of Dec. 7, 1801, essay No. 14 of
March 2, 1802." 8 Works 333. In No. 66 of the Federalist Hamilton uses a similar
language, when he speaks of "that important and well-established maxim which requires a
separation between the different departments of power (66, 429).
107 9, 48.
108 73, 478.
109 66, 432. Similar, 71, 466: "The tendency of the legislative authority to absorb every
In governments purely republican [i.e., popular], this
other, has been fully displayed. ...
tendency is almost irresistible." Hamilton's distrust of the legislature is evident when he
continues that "the representatives ... in a popular assembly, seem sometimes to fancy that
they are the people themselves, and betray strong symptoms of impatience and disgust at
the least sign of opposition from any other quarter; as if the exercise of rights, by either the
executive or judiciary, were a breach of their privilege and an outrage to their dignity. They
often appear disposed to exert an imperious control over the other departments; and as
they commonly have the people on their side, they always act with such momentum as to
make it very difficult for the other members of the government to maintain the balance of
the Constitution" (71, 465-66). See also 66, 431-32. To Hamilton, all three departments
derive their power from that "fountain of all legitimate authority" (22, 141), the people.
Compare, with respect to the executive, 70, 455; 70, 461; the judiciary, essay 78.
110 "Examination of Jefferson's Message," essay 15. 8 Works 339.
-111 71, 465.
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devotion of the legislative? Such a separation must be merely nominal,
and incapable of producing the ends for which it was established [i.e.,
to check majority despotism for the sake of the individual]. It is one
thing to be subordinate to the laws, and another to be dependent on the
legislative body. The first comports with, the last violates, the fundamental principles of good government; and, whatever may be the forms
1 12
of the Constitution, unites all power in the same hands."'
As a further security against democratic excesses, Hamilton wants a
division of the legislature, since "in the 'legislature, promptitude of decision is oftener an evil than a benefit," and "the differences of opinion,
and the jarrings of the parties in that department..., though they may
sometimes obstruct plans,... often promote deliberation and circumspection, and serve to check excesses in the majority.""' 3 Hamilton sees in
the division a device for a more mature legislation. The upper chamber
4
serves as a check on the lower, although "the most popular branch""1
will remain "a full match, if not an overmatch, for every other member
of the Government."" 5
The separation of powers need not be absolute. There may exist "a
partial intermixture" of the departments "for special purposes" which
is "in some cases, not only proper but necessary to the mutual defence
of the several members of the government against each other.""" Thus
"an absolute or qualified negative in the executive upon the acts of the
legislative body" is "indispensable ' 117 in order that the executive might
be able to "defend himself against the depredations" of the legislature
by which "he might gradually be stripped of his authorities by successive
revolutions, or annihilated by a single vote."1 8 Besides, this creates "a
salutory check upon the legislative body, calculated to guard the community against the effects of faction, precipitancy, or of any impulse
unfriendly to the public good, which may happen to influence a majority
of that body."" 9 Furthermore, Hamilton concedes to the legislature the
132 71, 465-66. In essay 16 of his "Examination of Jefferson's Message of March 19, 1802,
Hamilton says "the COwCENTRATiOx of the powers of the different departments in the L.roisLATIVE BODY . . . is precisely the DFIITION Or DESPOTIsM." 8 Works 348-49.
113 70, 458.
114 66, 431.
115 66, 432. The necessity for Hamilton of a division of the legislature can be concluded
from 66, 431-32. When Mulford, supra note 25 at 44-45, says that "a single assembly .. .
would be inconsistent with all the principles of good government," he overlooks that Hamilton had here not in mind the disadvantages of a uni-cameral against a bi-cameral legislature, but the disadvantages arising from a concentration of all power in one assembly, as
was the case under the Articles, where Congress had legislative, executive, and judicial
functions.
116 66, 429.
117 66, 429-30.
118 73, 476.
119 Id. at 477.
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power of impeachment, as "an essential check
20

. . .

upon the encroach-

ments of the executive.'
No doubt Hamilton considers institutional power-balances as conducive to Free Government. In later years he extensively quoted Madison's essay 51 with its conspicuous emphasis on institutional powerbalances.' 2 1 Nevertheless, if one reads the FEDERALIST, one feels that

Hamilton considers the separation of powers not so much as a device
for the sake of power-balance per se, but rather as a means for deconcentrating power from the legislature. While advocating possibilities
for a decrease of legislative power, he demonstrates the necessity of
power-concentration in the executive. And whereas "in the legislature,
promptitude of decision is oftener an evil than a benefit, 11 22 "energy in
the Executive is a leading character in the definition of good government,
... essential to the protection of the community against foreign attacks;
...to the steady administration of the laws; .

.

. to the protection of

property... ; to the security of liberty against.., faction."1 23 In order

1 24
to have energy, or power, in the executive, Hamilton wants its unity,

duration,'2 5 and an adequate provision for its, support. 2 6 Madison considers "the accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and
judiciary in the same hands . . . tyranny."'1 27 Hamilton, on the other
hand, concentrates his attack on an all-powerful legislature. For him, the
"CONCENTRATION of the powers of the different departments in the LEGISLATIVE BODY . . . is precisely the DEFINITION OF DESPOTISM."' 25 While

Madison is against a concentration of power in any department and thus
opens the way for his system of power-balances, Hamilton is against a
concentration of power in the legislature (consider the italics in the
passage quoted!). To him, a power-concentration in the executive need
not result in despotism.
Thus Hamilton, while recognizing the advantages of both territorial
and institutional power-divisions, leaves no doubt that it is rather the
concentration of power that is conducive to Free Government. This becomes even more evident when he considers the implications of the concomitance of the internal division and the external existence of power in
a state. In territorial respects, this concomitance means that in a federal
state the government, in order to constitute a power, must possess the
120 66, 430.

121 "Examination of Jefferson's Message," op. cit. supra note 112.
122
123
124
125
126
127
128

70, 458.
Id. at 454.
No. 70.
Nos. 71, 72.
No. 73.
47, 313.
"Examination of Jefferson's Message," essay 16. 8 Works 348-49.
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authority to "break the fatal charm" of "the political monster of imperium
in imperio."1'9 This amounts to the superiority of federal over state
legislation and the possibility of the execution of federal law within the
states. The superiority of federal law in turn implies the existence of
some federal authority which can decide matters arising from the complex of federalism. Hamilton here recognizes the supremacy provision.
In institutional respects, the concomitance of (internal) power-division
and (external) power-existence requires the recognition of an authority
which can decide upon the scope of the powers in the different departments. This authority is the judiciary with the power of judicial review.
The supremacy provision "only declares a truth, which flows immediately and necessarily from the institution of a federal government. '130 "If a number of political societies enter into a larger political
society, the laws which the latter may enact, pursuant to the powers
intrusted to it by its constitution, must necessarily be supreme over
those societies, and the individuals of whom they are composed. It
would otherwise be a mere treaty, dependent on the good faith of the
parties, and not a government, which is only another word for POLITICAL POWER AND SUPREMACY.'
32

3

'

Therefore, state officials have to observe

federal law.
Since "laws are a dead letter without courts to expound
and define their true meaning and operation,' 33 Hamilton, in order to
prevent the states from jeopardizing the power of the federal govern-

ment, wants, for the interpretation of federal law "one SUPRME TRIBU34
NAL . . . instituted under the . . . authority which makes the law.'-

It is a federal supreme court which has to decide on matters arising out
of the federal structure of the nation, 1 35 and the danger of a diminution
of the power of the federal government is thus reduced to a minimum.
As the supremacy provision secures power-concentration in the federal
government, judicial review secures the power of the constitution. Hamilton emphasizes that the principle of judicial review does not in itself amount
to "a superiority of the judicial to the legislative power."'13 0 Still, saying
that "the interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of
the courts,"'13 7 and giving the courts the rights to declare legislative acts
void, he de facto enthrones the judiciary over the legislature. Considering the judiciary as "the citadel of the public justice and the public
129 15, 89.
130 33, 202.
'13 Id. at 201.

132 27, 169.

133 22, 138.
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security,"'"" he sees "an excellent barrier to the encroachments and oppressions of the representative body" in its independence. 13 9 For the

protection of the individual, Hamilton wants the power-concentration in
the legislature replaced by a power-concentration in the judiciary. The
judiciary is a bulwark for the protection from "legislative encroachments" on a "limited Constitution," 4 "which contains certain specific
exceptions to the legislative authority; such, for instance, as that it shall
pass no bills of attainder, no ex-post-facto laws, and the like."'' Judicial review is the guarantor of Free Government against democratic excesses, mobocracy.' 42 Not the voice of the people (as reflected in the
legislature) is the voice of God,' 4 3 but that of the judges in whom the
requisite knowledge is combined with the requisite integrity'4 4 and who,
when saying 'No,' "do their duty as faithful guardians of the Constitution, where legislative invasions of it had been instituted by the major
45
voice of the community."'
Hamilton's opinion on the theoretical realization of Free Government
has important implications. If Free Government can best be realized
in a state which, while federal, has power concentrated in the national
government, and which, while adhering to the principle of the separation
of powers, has power concentrated in the non-legislative departments, the
negation of Free Government in a concrete state must mean the existence
of an omnipotent legislature and the absence of a strong federal government. Contrariwise, the achievement of Free Government must mean
the absence of power-concentration in the legislature and a concentration of power in the federal government. How Free Government is seen
in Hamilton's FEDERALIST as negated under the Articles and achieved
under the Constitution, we shall next consider.
[To be concluded]
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142 It is interesting to note that essay 78 is as much a treatise for the protection of the
individual's rights against democratic excesses as an advocacy for judicial review.
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